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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)( j) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether former Commissioners of Financial 
Institutions W. Smoot Brimhall and Mirvin D. Borthick, in the 
discharge of their statutory responsibilities, owed a duty of 
care to appellants individually on which a cause of action for 
gross negligence can be based. 
Since the existence of an actionable legal duty is a 
question of law, no deference is accorded to the decision below 
on this issue. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether Borthick and Brimhall are entitled to good 
faith immunity. 
The standard of review for this issue is that the court 
accords no deference to the ruling below. The issue was decided 
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that kind of 
motion involves no factual determination which would justify 
deference to a trail court's decision. See 5A C. Wright, A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (2d ed. 1990). 
3. Whether appellants' claim of gross negligence 
against former Commissioner of Financial Institutions, W. Smoot 
Brimhall is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
Since this issue presents only a conclusion of law, no 
deference is accorded to the decision below. Madsen II, 769 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988) . 
4. Whether the trial court properly refused to certify 
this lawsuit as a class action. 
Since class action certification is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court, the standard of review for this 
issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
class certification. See Anderson v. City of Albequerques, 690 
F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1982). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
Statutes and rules whose interpretation is 
determinative are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-1, 7-1-3, 7-1-7, 7-1-8, 7-1-13, 
7-1-14, 7-1-17, 7-1-18, 7-1-26, 63-30-4, 63-30-4(2), 70B-1-102, 
70B-2-104, 70B-3-104, 70B-2-106, 70B-3-503, 70B-3-504, 70B-3-506, 
70B-6-103, 70B-6-104, 70B-6-109, 70B-6-110, 78-12-26, 78-12-28, 
78-12-29, Utah R. Civ. P. 23. 
The texts of these rules are contained in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by eleven investors in Grove Finance 
Company to recover the amount of their investment plus interest 
from Brimhall and Borthick, the former Commissioners of the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions. Appellants initially sued 
Commissioner Borthick and the State, but their action against the 
State and the Commissioner in his representative capacity was 
barred under the notice-of-claim requirement of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Madsen I, 658 P.2d 627, 632-3 (Utah 
1983). Prior to 1983, the Immunity Act arguably permitted suits 
against officials in an individual capacity where gross 
negligence was alleged. See Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 247, 250-52 
(Utah 1988). Appellants then filed this action against 
Commissioners Brimhall and Borthick in their individual 
capacities claiming gross negligence. 
The appellants allege that the Commissioners were 
grossly negligent in failing to monitor Grove Finance Company's 
financial soundness, at the same level of scrutiny applied to a 
bank or other depository institution under Chapter 7 of the Utah 
Code; and in the alternative, under provisions of Utah's previous 
version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, in failing to 
investigate Grove Finance's "financial responsibility" prior to 
licensing, to examine its records and business, apparently also 
for financial soundness, and to revoke its license. Had the 
Commissioners done this, the appellants claim, they would not 
have invested in Grove. Appellants thus base their action on a 
duty by the Commissioners running to investors to have prevented 
their investment loss, presumably by investigating the financial 
soundness of Grove Finance and then either closing Grove sooner 
or notifying them of the institution's condition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BRIMHALL AND BORTHICK OWED NO ACTIONABLE 
DUTY TO APPELLANTS 
Brimhall and Borthick were charged with statutory 
responsibilities in serving as Commissioners of Financial 
Institutions. Those obligations were not actionable legal duties 
owed to each appellant. According to the weight of authority, 
the obligations were "public duties," the breach of which is not 
actionable. 
POINT II 
BRIMHALL AND BORTHICK ARE PROTECTED BY 
GOOD FAITH IMMUNITY 
The common law grants immunity to public officials from 
suits growing out of the performance of lawfully authorized 
discretionary duties. This protection is available so long as 
the official acts in good faith and without any willful or 
intentional wrongdoing. The actionable conduct identified by 
appellants involves discretionary activities, namely interpreting 
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statutes that define the obligation of a Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions to inspect financial institutions. Since 
appellants allege merely gross negligence in performing these 
discretionary duties, Brimhall and Brothick are entitled to good 
faith immunity. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE ANY ACTION AGAINST 
COMMISSIONER BRIMHALL UNTIL MORE THAN THREE YEARS 
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN THIS MATTER. THE 
ACTION AGAINST HIM IS THEREFORE BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), OR 78-12-29(2) 
Appellants' cause of action arose no later than July 
18, 1980. The longest statute of limitation applicable to that 
cause of action is three years. The action against Brimhall was 
filed July 20, 1983, more than three years after the claim arose, 
The claim against Brimhall is barred by the statute of 
limitations, and the savings statute at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 
does not help appellants. The appellants' 1983 action does not 
relate back to their 1981 lawsuit involving the same subject 
matter, but relates to different claims and defendants. 
POINT IV 
CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE RES JUDICATA BARS THE PUTATIVE CLASS 
MEMBERS FROM PROCEEDING IN THE ACTION. 
The putative class members previously commenced an 
action like that of appellants. Their claims were dismissed by 
the trial court, and this Court affirmed that judgment in Hilton 
v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504 (Utah 1989). The class members are 
bound by that determination here because the four elements of the 
claim preclusion branch of res judicata have been satisfied. 
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POINT V 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS NOT A BASIS FOR CERTIFYING 
A CLASS TO PROCEED AS A CLASS ACTION 
The putative class members contend they were certified 
as a class in Hilton v. Borthick and therefore must be certified 
as such in this action. This unusual theory cannot be used to 
circumvent the requirements of Rule 23, Utah R. Civ. P. The 
class cannot satisfy these requirements, so denial of 
certification was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BRIMHALL AND BORTHICK OWED NO ACTIONABLE 
DUTY TO APPELLANTS 
This Court has established that a precondition to 
maintaining a negligence action is the existence of a duty of 
care owed by the defendant to the particular plaintiff. Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 413-15, 418 (Utah 1986); Weber 
v. Sprinqville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). Duty is 
entirely a question of law to be determined by the court. See 
Ld. 
A. Public Duty in Utah 
In negligence actions against public entities or 
officials, it is also well established that the plaintiff must 
show the breach of a duty owed to him as an individual and not 
merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general public. 
In Obray v. Malmberq, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) a 
claimed failure by the sheriff to investigate a burglary was 
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ruled not actionable. In Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 
(Utah 1984), this Court refused to adopt a purported "trend" 
holding public officials liable where deputies had stopped, but 
not arrested, the intoxicated decedent prior to his fatal 
motorcycle accident. Despite a statutory charge to "make all 
lawful arrests," Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2, the duty of police to 
the public at large was not a duty to the decedent giving rise to 
tort liability. This Court has also concluded that, when a 
governmental entity undertakes to render services, the scope of 
any duty purported to have thus been assumed will be narrowly 
construed. See Weber, 725 P.2d at 1364 (undertaking maintenance 
and dredging operations on Hobble Creek did not give rise to duty 
to protect city residents from hazards associated with the 
creek). 
This Court has recently reaffirmed and clarified that a 
duty must be owed to the plaintiff as an individual in Ferree v. 
State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). That case involved a wrongful 
death action alleging that corrections officers were "reckless, 
negligent, or grossly negligent" in their failure to supervise an 
inmate who killed the decedent while on an authorized release 
from a halfway house. In affirming a summary judgment in favor 
of the State and corrections officials, this Court stated that 
"[t]o establish negligence or gross negligence, the plaintiff 
must first establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff. . . . " Ici. at 151 (emphasis added). 
This Court continued: 
For a governmental agency and its agents 
to be liable for negligently caused injuries 
suffered by a member of the public, the 
plaintiff must show a breach of a duty owed 
him as an individual, not merely the breach 
of an obligation owed the general public at 
large, . . . 
Id. To adopt the plaintiff's theory of duty, the Ferree Court 
reasoned, would impose too broad a duty of care which would 
expose corrections officers to potential liability for every 
wrong that flows from necessary correctional programs. Noting 
that other jurisdictions have generally held that there is "no 
duty toward persons in the general public" in such circumstances, 
this Court further found that the public interest would not be 
served "by imposing liability on corrections officials . . . for 
the uncertain success that attends parol and probation programs." 
Id. "In short, the officials had no duty of due care to the 
victim apart from their general duty to the public at large." 
Id. 
The present case is similar to Ferree in that the duty 
of a Commissioner of Financial Institutions is to protect the 
public financial system generally, not to guarantee any and all 
losses suffered by investors in all financial institutions. 
Neither statute nor common sense justifies inflicting the 
Commissioners with personal liability for the losses of 
individual investors because they concluded in good faith that 
they lacked statutory authority to regulate a particular class of 
institutions for a financial soundness, or because their 
regulation was arguably imperfect in some other way. The public 
interest would not be served by permitting this action because it 
would unduly burden public officials charged with financial 
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regulation, deter able individuals from serving in that 
capacity, and chill legitimate regulatory efforts. 
In a very similar recent case, addressing a 
governmental immunity issue, this Court cited sound public policy 
which is just as pertinent here: 
Public entities and public employees 
should not be liable for failure . . . to 
enforce any law. They should not be liable 
for failing to inspect persons or property 
adequately to determine compliance with 
health and safety regulations. Nor should 
they be liable for negligent or wrongful 
issuance or revocation of licenses and 
permits. . . . To provide the utmost public 
protection, governmental entities should not 
be dissuaded from engaging in such activities 
by the fear that liability may be imposed if 
an employee performs his duties inadequately. 
Moreover, if liability existed for this type 
of activity, the risk exposure to which a 
public entity would be subject would include 
virtually all activities going on within the 
community. . . . Far more persons would 
suffer if government did not perform these 
functions at all than would be benefited by 
permitting recovery in those cases where the 
government is shown to have performed 
inadequately. 
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst., 782 P.2d 506, 512-13 (Utah 
1989)(Citing 4 California Law Revision Commission, Reports, 
Recommendations, and Studies, 817-18 (1963)). 
B. Public Duty in Other Jurisdictions 
There apparently is no Utah case dealing squarely with 
the duty issue in the financial institutions setting. Courts in 
other jurisdictions, however, have nearly unanimously held that 
even where a general statutory duty exists to regulate financial 
That Commissioner Borthick has had to spend nearly ten years 
defending this and related Grove Finance actions is convincing 
evidence on this score. 
institutions, there is no duty of care upon which liability may 
be based. 
In Scott v. Department of Commerce, 763 P.2d 341 (Nev. 
1988), disappointed investors contended that the statutory scheme 
regulating mortgage companies imposed on the State an affirmative 
duty to supervise and investigate such companies so as to prevent 
investor losses. The allegations made by appellants in the 
present case are very close to those made in Scott: 
In particular, the Scotts contend that 
the commissioner of financial institutions 
had a duty to inspect mortgage companies and 
to insure that mortgage companies operated 
only if they were eligible for licensing. 
Nevada statute provides that the Commissioner 
"shall . . . [c]onduct such examinations and 
investigations as are necessary to insure 
that mortgage companies meet the requirements 
of this chapter for obtaining a license . . . 
on a continuing basis." N.R.S. 
645b.060(2)(e). . . . The Scotts contend 
that under these provisions, once the State 
was informed that [the mortgage company] was 
falsely and fraudulently representing itself 
as solvent, the State had a duty to 
investigate and to insure that [the company] 
operated only if it was eligible for 
licensing. 
Id. at 342-3. These allegations notwithstanding, the court ruled 
that "when a governmental duty runs to the public, no private 
cause of action is created by a breach of such duty. [citations 
omitted] This rule applies to the regulation of financial 
institutions." Id. at 344 (emphasis added). 
The Scott court relied on Commonwealth, Dept. of 
Banking and Securities v. Brown, 605 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1980). In 
Brown, the plaintiffs sought damages for the dereliction of state 
examiners in not ascertaining or reporting the true condition of 
_ i i _ 
the records of two building and loan associations. Reversing a 
judgment and dismissing the action, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
stated: 
There is no public policy requiring 
government to guarantee the success of its 
efforts. When the governmental entity is 
performing a self-imposed protective function 
as it was in the case at hand, the individual 
citizen has no right to demand recourse 
against it though he is injured by its 
failure to efficiently perform such function. 
Any ruling to the contrary would tend to 
constitute the commonwealth an insurer of the 
quality of services its many agents perform 
and serve only to stifle governments attempts 
to perform needed services to the public 
which could not otherwise be effectively 
supplied. 
Id. at 4 99. Conceding that the State may sometimes act 
imperfectly, but finding that risk to be "the natural concomitant 
of our form of government," the court continued: M[w]e perceive 
that the public interest is better served by a government which 
can aggressively seek to identify and meet the current need of 
the citizenry, uninhibited by the threat of financial loss should 
its good faith efforts prove less than optimal—or even 
desirable—results. " Id. 
Numerous federal cases have held that the FDIC and 
other federal regulatory agencies, although statutorily charged 
with supervisory duties over financial institutions, nevertheless 
have no duty of care upon which defrauded investors or others may 
base recovery. See, e.g., FDIC v. Renda, 692 F. Supp. 129, 135 
(D. Kan. 1988)(gives summary of cases holding that "regulatory 
activities of a governmental agency do not give rise to a duty to 
discover and report possible fraud or wrongdoing to a bank or its 
. . . shareholders . . . or depositors"). 
-1 9-
In complex litigation involving what was then the 
largest bank failure in United States history, the court followed 
this reasoning in granting the government's motion for summary 
judgment. In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 
478 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The court found that no common 
law theory and no statutory provision regarding duties of the 
Comptroller, Federal Reserve Bank, or FDIC created any actionable 
duty. The court stated that supervision of the banking system is 
for the protection of the public as a whole, not for the 
protection of the banks and their shareholders. 
This analysis has lead every court 
addressing the issue to conclude that the 
comptroller's mandate to conduct national 
bank examinations does not create an 
actionable duty running to the examined bank; 
the comptroller's failure to detect weakness 
or dishonesty at an examined bank gives rise 
to no cause of action against the United 
States. 
Id. at 215. Many other courts have reached the same conclusion. 
See Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1978); FSLIC v. 
Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); FDIC v. Niver, 685 
F. Supp. 766 (D. Kan. 1987); FDIC v. Dempster, 637 F. Supp. 362 
(E.D. Tenn. 1986); FDIC v. Jennings, 615 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Okla. 
1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1987); FSLIC v. Williams, 
599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984). 
The sound legal and policy bases relied on in these 
cases apply four-square here. Allowing this action would impose 
on public officials a duty impossible to fulfill—to insure that 
no investor in a financial institution ever looses the funds 
invested. If such a duty is imposed, it is difficult to imagine 
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how anyone in full possession of his or her faculties would ever 
again consent to serve the public in this position. 
C. Errors in Appellants' Arguments 
It is against the sound legal and policy bases in the 
above decisions that appellants contend Brimhall and Borthick 
owed actionable legal duties to them individually. They argue 
that the Commissioner had a duty to protect appellants. They 
also contended that the rule of Obray/ Christenson and Ferree 
does not apply in this personal capacity action. 
1. No duty to protect individuals 
In supposing the Commissioners owed a duty to them, 
appellants focus on statutory and case law. They reason that 
this legal authority establishes the Commissioners' legal 
obligation to protect them. Such authority, however, has no 
application here. 
Titles 7 and 70B were not designed to protect 
appellants. Title 7 plainly declares that its purpose is to 
protect the general public rather than particular individuals. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-3 (1979 Supp.) states that the Commissioner 
shall make a biennial report to the governor on banking business 
that is regulated in the State "and other matters that may be of 
interest to the public. ..." (emphasis added). This Court 
affirmed this point in the Tripp case cited by plaintiffs: "Once 
each year it is made [the Commissioners] duty to examine certain 
institutions. The public has such interest in the maintenance of 
such institutions." Tripp v. District Court, 89 Utah 8, 56 P.2d 
1355, 1359 (1936)(emphasis added). Appellants' contrary 
1 A 
contention is wrong because the statutes on which they rely were 
not applicable when the cause of action arose in 1980. Those 
statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-102 and -301 were enacted in 1981 
after appellants' claim arose. Thus, any possible extension of a 
Commissioner's public duty in the 1981 provisions does not apply 
to Borthick or Brimhall. 
Title 70B is similarly unsuited for the protection of 
appellants. Its purpose is to "protect consumer buyers, lessors, 
and borrowers" against the improprieties of some creditors. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70B-1-102(2)(d). Consumer buyers and borrowers are 
persons, not organizations, who insure debt to obtain goods, 
services, or interests in land. Utah Code Ann. § 70B-2-104, 
70B-3-104. Consumer lessors are persons, not organizations who 
lease goods. _Id. at § 70B-2-106. Under these definitions, 
appellants are not "consumer buyers, lessors, [or] borrowers." 
Appellants call themselves "depositors" with Grove Finance and 
they alleged they "placed large sums of money" with that 
institution. Placing or investing money does not involve a 
purchase or lease of consumer goods and is entirely unrelated to 
incurring a debt and becoming a debtor. Appellants are not 
within the class to be protected by title 70B. 
The three court opinions that appellants cite are 
unpersuasive. The courts in Little, Maricopa County and Franz 
extended a public duty to particular individuals because they 
found that state statutes were intended to protect certain 
classes of which the plaintiffs were members. It was established 
above, however, that appellants were not to be protected by 
Titles 7 and 70B. Therefore, the reasoning of appellants case 
authority has no application here. 
In Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 
667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), this Court decided that the Division 
owed a duty to protect a particular autistic child who was in its 
legal custody. Id., at 54. This holding was based on a statute 
that expressly imposed on legal custodians a duty to protect 
custodial children. Ici. In the present case, by contrast, the 
statutes appellants cite are completely different. Titles 7 and 
70B do not govern the kind of intimate, dependent relation that 
the Little statute involved. The Titles define the obligations 
of a public official in regulating commercial institutions. 
Moreover, neither Title 7 nor Title 70B is designed to protect 
appellants as individuals. Title 7's obligations were to the 
public, and Title 70B duties were to consumer debtors, not 
investors or creditors/depositors. The distinction between this 
case and Little demonstrates that Little has no application here. 
The holdings in Franz and Maricopa County are similarly 
inapplicable. In Tcherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187, 191 (7th 
Cir. 1978), the court extended an official's public duty to 
savings and loan depositors because his express statutory 
obligations were to protect the savings and loan "association". 
Similarly, in State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 599 
P.2d 777 (Ariz. 1979), a public official had a duty to particular 
persons because they were in a class to be protected by state 
statute. In the present case, Title 7 and 70B do not protect 
appellants because Title 7 obligations are owed to the public and 
1 C 
duties under 70B benefit consumer buyers, borrowers and lessors 
rather than depositors. 
Appellants finally cite Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1989). They rely on it to suggest that the 
Commissioners' statutory obligations are duties running to 
appellants as well as the public. In making such an argument the 
appellants misread Owens. The decision expressly states it is 
founded on common law rules governing the determination of duty. 
Id. at 1189, n.2. The Owens Court did not decide whether a 
public duty ran in favor of particular individuals because it 
found there was no duty whatsoever. Ici. Owens is inapplicable 
because it deals with determining duty and not with extending 
public duty to private individuals 
2. Public duty and statutory immunity 
Appellants further contend that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act forecloses application of the rule of Obray, 
Christensen and Ferree. Their argument, drawn from foreign 
jurisdictions, is that this rule is a form of sovereign immunity 
that cannot be used to supplement the grants and waivers of 
immunity in the Governmental Immunity Act. Since the Act permits 
personal capacity suits for gross negligence, appellants reason 
that no other rule of law can bar their action. 
This argument fails for several reasons. First, this 
Court in Obray, Christensen and Ferree held that personal 
capacity actions could not proceed in the absence of a duty owed 
to a particular plaintiff rather than the public at large. 
Second, the decisions cited by appellants employ reasoning 
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inconsistent with Utah law. They uniformly assume that common 
law cannot broaden statutory immunity granted by the legislature, 
and that assumption is contrary to Utah law. For example, the 
court in Brennon v. Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 725 (Oregon 1979) based 
its holding on a finding that "we find no warrant for engrafting 
an additional exception onto the statute [that waives 
governmental immunity]." By contrast, this Court has expressly 
held that the concept of public duty is not a form of sovereign 
immunity. Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53. Moreover, statute and 
common law permit the use of common law immunity as a supplement 
to the immunities granted in the Governmental Immunity Act. See, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2); Utah State University v. Sutro & Co, 
646 P.2d 715, 721 (Utah 1982). 
D. Conclusion 
The statutory obligations of Brimhall and Borthick to 
regulate Grove Finance were for the benefit of the public. They 
were not intended to protect appellants. The weight of authority 
is consistent with this conclusion. Appellants contrary 
contention is based on case law that reflects a minority view and 
on statutes that do not protect appellants. The duties of the 
Commissioners were public duties, the breach of which is not 
actionable. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSIONERS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT 
UNDER THE GOOD-FAITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY EXTENDED 
TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS PERFORMING LAWFULLY AUTHORIZED 
DISCRETIONARY DUTIES 
In Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 
(Utah 1982) this Court affirmed a dismissal of third-party 
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complaints against members of the USU institutional counsel. The 
University had sued brokers to recover losses sustained in an 
investment program after it was determined that the investments 
were not authorized by statute. Although the counsel members had 
allowed the improper use of public funds, this Court stated: 
The generally recognized doctrine of law 
is that public officials are protected by a 
qualified immunity from suits growing out of 
the performance of lawfully authorized 
discretionary duties, so long as they are 
acting in good faith and are not guilty of 
any willful or intentional wrongdoing. The 
underlying reasons for this are that such 
protection is in accord with the interest of 
justice; is necessary as a mater of public 
policy in order not to deter persons of 
capability and integrity from accepting the 
responsibilities of public office; and that 
when they are so serving they should be free 
to exercise their judgment without fear of 
damage suits because someone thinks they made 
a mistake in judgment. . . . [W]hen a public 
official is so acting in good-faith in 
performing his discretionary duties he is not 
liable in damages simply because he may make 
a mistake in judgment. 
Id. at 721 (footnotes omitted). Like the plaintiffs in Sutro, 
the appellants here do not allege that Commissioners Brimhall and 
Borthick acted "in bad faith nor that [they] committed any 
willful or intentional wrong." Id. 
Recognition of official good-faith immunity is in 
accord with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2) and was enacted within 
the year following the Sutro decision. That section states 
M[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely 
effecting any immunity from suit which a governmental entity or 
employee may otherwise assert under State or Federal law." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2). 
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Appellants contend that such immunity is not available 
because the Commissioners' acts were ministerial rather than 
discretionary. Since Titles 7 and 70B impose mandatory tasks, 
appellants reason that the duties involved no exercise of 
discretion. 
Appellants mischaracterize the nature of the 
Commissioners' duties. First, they fail to recognize that the 
Commissioners would be required initially to decide whether Grove 
Finance was subject to Title 7 or Title 70B. Only after making 
such a decision could they proceed with the mandatory tasks 
appellants mention. It is this determination that is 
discretionary. See Gormely v. State, 189 S.E. 288 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1936). Second, appellants incorrectly assume that the mandatory 
tasks of Title 70B are truly ministerial. The parties dispute 
the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-505(l) and -506(1) which 
appellants claim obligated the Commissioners to inspect Grove 
Finance for financial soundness. This dispute in statutory 
construction demonstrates that Brimhall and Borthick would 
exercise discretion in determining that their mandatory duties 
were under those sections. Even appellants have conceded the 
discretionary nature of this decision by pleading in their 
complaint alternative causes of action under Title 7 and Title 
70B. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE ANY ACTION AGAINST 
COMMISSIONER BRIMHALL UNTIL MORE THAN THREE YEARS 
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN THIS MATTER. THE 
ACTION AGAINST HIM IS THEREFORE BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN- § 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), OR 78-12-29(2). 
It is undisputed that (1) this cause of action arose, 
at the latest, on July 18, 1980, when Grove Finance closed its 
doors and possession was taken by the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions; (2) Commissioner Brimhall was not named a party 
defendant in Madsen I, either by name or descriptive designation; 
and (3) Commissioner Brimhall was first named a defendant when 
Madsen II was filed on July 20, 1983, more than three years after 
the cause of action arose. In the original complaint in Madsen 
1^  Commissioner Brimhall is not named and no allegation is made 
of any act or omission which occurred during his administration 
giving rise to liability. Unlike Madsen I, where only 
Commissioner Borthick was named in an official capacity, both 
Commissioners are named in this action in their individual 
capacity. Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 246-7 (Utah 1988). Thus, in 
order for the action to be deemed timely against Commissioner 
Brimhall, a statue of limitation longer than three years must be 
determined to apply. 
There are three statutes of limitation which might 
possibly apply—Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1) or 78-
12-29(2). While this Court has not squarely ruled which of these 
statutes applies in this case, Madsen I, 658 P.2d 627, 631 n.7 
(Utah 1983), Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988), appellants 
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have not alleged until this appeal that any different provision 
could apply-2 See, e.g., Madsen II, 769 P.2d at 253-4. 
Of the three possible statutes of limitation, Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-12-26(4), the three year statute which bars an action 
Mfor a liability created by the statutes of this state," seems 
mostly likely to apply. Madsen I makes clear that any action 
which Appellants now have against Commissioners Brimhall and 
Borthick must be brought against them in their personal 
capacities, under a standard of gross negligence pursuant to the 
requirements of section 63-30-4. 658 P.2d at 633; See Madsen 
II, 769 P.2d at 247, 252-3, n.12. Appellants' causes of action, 
if any, are thus created and governed by section 63-30-4. This 
is an action "created by the statutes of this state" as provided 
by section 78-12-26(4) and, consequently, the action was barred 
after three years. 
It is also worthy of note that in Madsen I the 
appellants attempted to persuade the Court that the action was 
brought at common-law, and not under the Governmental Immunity 
Act, since the latter would subject appellants "to a shorter 
statute of limitations than would apply if their cause of action 
were rooted in a common-law claim (e.g., compare § 78-12-26(4) 
with § 78-12-25(2) [then, the catch-all provision for tort 
actions]." Madsen I, 658 P.2d at 631, n.7 (emphasis added). But 
this Court rejected that argument, squarely holding the 
2 
In their brief to this Court, appellants for the 
first time allege that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) applies. 
Brief of Appellants, p. 17. Since appellants did not raise that 
issue at the trial court in their opposition to Defendant 
Brimhall's Motion for Summary Judgment, they may not now do so. 
_oo 
Governmental Immunity Act to apply in this action, and by its 
language, clearly implying that the action against both the State 
and Commissioner Borthick would be governed by the statute of 
limitation in section 78-12-26(4). Id. 
In addition, appellants earlier in this action candidly 
conceded that: 
[They] filed the complaint with the court in 
the instant action on July 20, 1983. The 
cause of action arose when Grove Finance was 
forced to close its doors on July 18, 1980. 
Under normal circumstances, that action would 
have been barred by the statute of 
limitations which at most ran for three years 
and thus, possibly expired on July 18, 1983. 
However, section 78-12-40, Utah Code Ann., 
applies in this matter. . . . 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (dated October 7, 1983), p. 4 (emphasis added). Since 
appellants concede that the first time an action was filed by 
them naming or even describing Commissioner Brimhall was more 
than three years after their cause of action arose, the action 
was barred by the statute of limitation. 
A sound case can also be made for application of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-28(1), the two-year limit on actions against an 
"officer upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his 
official capacity, and by virtue of his office, or by the 
omission of an official duty. . . . " (emphasis added). 
Commissioner Brimhall is named in his personal capacity, albeit 
for acts taken or omitted as Financial Commissioner, and the 
gravamen of the action is that he somehow omitted an official 
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duty in failing to regulate Grove Finance so as to prevent loss 
3 
of the Appellants' investments. 
Appellants argue, however, that section 78-12-40 
applies because there is an identity of interest between 
Commissioner Brimhall and Commissioner Borthick. It is claimed 
that the filing of the Complaint in this action, which names the 
Commissioners in their personal capacity, relates back to the 
filing of Madsen I in 1981 because of the identity of interest 
between Commissioners Brimhall and Borthick. This theory fails 
for two reasons. 
First, the record establishes no identity of interest 
between the two Commissioners of Financial Institutions. 
Appellants contend there is an identity of interest because 
Borthick continued the same policy followed by the Department of 
Financial Institutions under Brimhall as to the extent of 
regulation over supervised lenders permitted by law. How this 
establishes an identity of interest is not explained. It must be 
remembered that Commissioners Brimhall and Borthick are being 
sued in their personal capacities, not in their official 
capacities. 
This Court has defined "identity of interest" in this 
context as "so closely related in their business operations that 
notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the 
action to the other." Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.# 681 
To the extent that the action can be characterized as 
an action for a penalty against the State or its officials, 
section 78-12-29(2) could also apply, since the action is clearly 
"given to an individual." 
_Ov1_ 
P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984). It simply cannot be pretended that 
Brimhall and Borthick as individuals, although both former public 
officials, have such a close relation that notice to one would 
serve as notice to both. Were appellants' argument to stand, 
presumably any former public official could be sued in his 
individual capacity after the running of a statute of limitation 
as long as a successor was sued within the statutory time. 
In Perry, this Court affirmed summary judgment against 
a subcontractor who filed an untimely third-party complaint 
against a supplier and manufacturer, holding that privity of 
contract was an insufficient identity of interest. Moreover, in 
Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 581, 586-7 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), the court held that a former policy holder's motion to 
amend a complaint to allege a cause of action against an 
insurance salesman was properly denied. Even though the salesman 
was already named in a third-party action by the defendant 
insurance company on an indemnification theory, the policy 
holder's negligence action was time-barred and could not be saved 
on the basis of any "identity of interest." 
Second, the "identity of interest" exception applies 
only where an amendment is sought in a pending cause of action 
under Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P.—not as here where an attempt is made 
to have the filing of a second action relate back to the filing 
of a different action previously dismissed. The theory simply 
does not apply in this setting. As stated in Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976): 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not 
apply to an amendment which substitutes or 
adds new parties for those brought before the 
court by the original pleadings—whether 
plaintiff or defendant. This for the reason 
that such would amount to a new cause of 
action/ and if such were allowed to relate 
back to the filing of the complaint/ the 
purpose of a statute of limitations would be 
defeated. 
Id. at 906 (emphasis added). 
As in the present case, the doctrine does not avail 
where an effort is made to have a wholly separate cause of action 
relate back to an earlier complaint. The reason this action has 
survived is that this Court in Madsen II was persuaded that it is 
a different action from Madsen I, not subject to dismissal on res 
judicata grounds even though the earlier action was dismissed. 
Appellants cannot now be legitimately heard to argue that the two 
actions are somehow the same, allowing the naming of Commissioner 
Brimhall for the first time in 1983 to relate back to the filing 
of Madsen I in 1981. 
In addition, Madsen II dictates no contrary result. 
The reversal of summary judgment on the limitation issue under 
section 78-12-40 was based upon the principle that "a plaintiff 
whose action fails on grounds other than its merits may have one 
year from the date of the failure to file a new action so long as 
the first action was 'commenced within due time.'" 769 P.2d at 
254 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40)(emphasis added). In its 
ruling on the petition for rehearing in Madsen 11/ this Court 
apparently accepted the argument that the issue of Commissioner 
Brimhall not having been named in Madsen I was not raised on the 
motion or on appeal, and was therefore not properly before the 
Court. The issue not having been raised or considered before, is 
properly before the Court at this time. 
Even if this Court finds that the Appellants' action 
against Commissioner Brimhall is not barred by the statute of 
limitations; the trial court's grant of summary judgment was 
harmless error. The "public duty" rule and good-faith immunity, 
as argued in Points I and II of this brief, also apply to 
Commissioner Brimhall. Both of those doctrines would preclude 
any claim against Commissioner Brimhall for his good-faith 
actions which relate to his duties as Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions. 
POINT IV 
CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
BECAUSE RES JUDICATA BARS THE PUTATIVE CLASS 
MEMBERS FROM PROCEEDING IN THE ACTION 
The putative class, consisting of all investors in 
Grove Finance save the Madsen appellants, sued the state and 
Commissioner Borthick for all of their losses occasioned by the 
failure of Grove Finance. They alleged improper supervision and 
regulation by the Commissioner and Department of Financial 
Institutions. After extensive discovery, briefing and argument, 
summary judgment was granted against them on the basis of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. That order was affirmed in Hilton v. 
Borthick, 791 P.2d 504, 504 (Utah 1989). That judgment is 
binding on the class and cannot be circumvented by certification 
in a second similar action. 
In a recent decision in this case, this Court set out 
the requirements for application of the claim preclusion branch 
of res judicata: 
First, both cases must involve the same 
parties or their privies. Second, the claim 
that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or must be one 
that could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits. [citations omitted]. 
Madsen II, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Each of these 
requirements is satisfied here. 
First, the appellants did not dispute that Commissioner 
Brimhall in his official capacity is in privity to the state. 
Id. Furthermore, Commissioner Borthick is named in both the 
instant action and Hilton. 
Second, allegations of gross negligence or other 
impropriety against the Commissioners certainly could have been 
raised by the class in Hilton. Both actions arise out of 
precisely the same circumstances and both seek exactly the same 
relief against the state or its commissioners. " [Relitigation 
of issues which were actually litigated or could have been 
litigated in a prior proceeding is barred by res judicata." 
Cox v. Cedar City Corp., 664 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983). In Cox, 
after losing a nuisance action filed by the city, the property 
owner brought an action for damages for conversion of his 
personal property during abatement. This was a matter, this 
Court said, which could have been litigated in a prior 
proceeding. Similarly here, by slightly shifting ground on one 
legal theory in alleging "gross negligence" instead of mere 
negligence does not deprive the first judgment of preclusive 
affect as to the class. 
As to the third criterion in the present case, this 
Court found that appellants' failure to file a statutory notice 
of claim amounted to failure to meet a precondition to suit, 
which amounted to a "lack of jurisdiction" under Rule 41 (b). No 
such situation is present with Hilton. The trial judge's ruling, 
following extensive discovery and briefing in which the factual 
background of the case was thoroughly explored by both parties 
and presented to the trial court, centered not on any procedural 
default by the plaintiffs, but on the application of substantive 
immunities preserved by the Immunity Act. It cannot be sensibly 
argued that this does not constitute a judgment on the merits. 
If it did not constitute a judgment on the merits, each of the 
1,250 investors could immediately file his or her own separate 
action, and this would be so in every case where a dismissal is 
granted based on substantive immunity. Moreover, it is clear 
that res judicata principles apply fully in class actions: 
There is of course no dispute that under 
elementary principles of prior adjudication a 
judgment in a properly entertained class 
action is binding on class members in any 
subsequent litigation. 
4 
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). 
4 
In Madsen II this Court recognized that construction of similar 
or identical Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be helpful. 
769 P.2d at 248-9 and n.4. 
-?Q-
POINT V 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS NOT A BASIS FOR CERTIFYING 
A CLASS TO PROCEED AS A CLASS ACTION 
Even if class certification is not barred by res 
judicata, collateral estoppel is not a basis for certifying a 
class to proceed as a class action. Under the Utah Rule 
governing class actions: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
U.R.C.P. 23(a)(emphasis added). 
In seeking class certification, the appellants' bear 
the burden of establishing that the cause of action merits 
5 
treatment of a class action and that all the requirements of the 
certification rule have been satisfied. 59 Am. Jur. 2nd § 78; 
Kniffin v. Colorado Western Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 586 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1980). In McCabe v. Burqeis, 75 111. 2nd 457, 389 N.E.2nd 
565 (1979), the court applied a similar class action rule and 
held that the "proponent of the class action has the burden of 
establishing these prerequisites and the court must find them 
present before it can sanction the maintenance of the action as a 
class action." Id. at 567. 
59 Am. Jur. 2nd § 78; Cincinatti v. Alexander, 54 Ohio St. 2nd 
248, 375 N.E. 2nd 1241 (1978). 
„ o n 
The appellants in this case have failed to carry their 
burden by simply alleging collateral estoppel. Class actions are 
used as a means of economy "motivated by the practical necessity 
of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not 
disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from 
enforcing their equitable wrongs." Wright, Miller, and Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2nd 1751 (citing Montgomery 
Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)). Class 
standing should not be granted simply because a similar case was 
granted class standing. Appellants have not shown or alleged 
that any of the requirements for class standing have been met, 
nor have they given any support for the proposition that class 
status may be granted on the basis of collateral estoppel. 
Plaintiffs also assert that because the procedural 
basis for class certification is identical in both cases, class 
status should be granted. The procedural basis is always 
identical in every class action, i.e., Rule 23 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. What is not identical are the facts and 
circumstances, which in the instant case, do not independently 
warrant class standing. 
As previously stated, the first requirement for 
maintaining a class action under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 23, is that the class be so numerous "that 
joinder of all members is impracticable" U.R.C.P. 23(a). 
Appellants' cause of action fails this first requirement. 
The only persons who can be members of a possible class 
are those with valid claims against the defendants. See, 
U.R.C.P. 23. The cause of action arose no later than July 18, 
1980. It is now over nine years since that date, far longer than 
any applicable statue of limitations term. See, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-1 to -47. No other investor could, at this late date, 
bring an action for gross negligence against Commissioners 
Borthick and Brimhall. Consequently, it is practical to join all 
members in this action. 
The jurisdictions which have considered whether a 
motion seeking class status relates back to the original filing 
date to preserve individual claims have returned a resounding no. 
The court in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 567 F.2d 429 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), held that: 
Filing cannot revive claims which are no 
longer viable at the time of filing. . . . 
Time barred members could not press their 
claims individually . . . and surely the 
employer's liability cannot be made to depend 
upon whether they come into court in a 
different character. . . . [0]nly those 
employees who could have filed charges with 
the commission individually when the class 
filing was made are properly members of the 
litigating class. 
Id. at 472. The court in Healy v. Loeb Rhodes & Co., 99 F.R.D. 
540 (N.D. 111. 1983), also held that "time barred claims are not 
revived by their assertion in a class action." _Id. at 543. 
Any motion now seeking class certification will not 
resurrect time barred claims of other investors. Only those 
persons who still have valid claims against the defendants may be 
part of the class. As this consists only of the appellants 
already named in the complaint, any motion for class standing or 
certification to include other plaintiffs, is improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly decided that the duties of a 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions are discretionary and only 
for the benefit of the public. The court below also properly 
denied class certification and granted summary judgment to 
Commissioner Brimhall on the basis of the statute of limitations. 
The judgments of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of Q A N L V X ^ , 1991. 
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ADDENDUM 
7-1-1. Department of financial institutions—Commissioner of financial 
institutions—Appointment, term, qualifications, salary,* oath and bond.— 
(!) There shall be a state department of financial institutions which 
*hall have charge of the execution of the laws of this state relating to 
banks and other financial institutions subject to this title and relating to 
the business conducted by each. 
(2) The chief officer of the state department of financial institutions 
shall be the commissioner of financial institutions who shall be appointed 
by the governor by and with the consent of the senate. He shall hold 
office for the term of four years and until his successor is appointed and 
qualified, but he shall be subject to removal at the pleasure of the governor. 
(3) The commissioner of financial institutions shall be a resident of 
this state and a citizen of the United States and shall have had sufficient 
experience in banking in an executive or administrative capacity or as 
an employee of a state or federal bank supervisory agency to demonstrate 
his qualifications and fitness to perform the duties of his office. 
(4) The salary of the commissioner of financial institutions shall be 
fixed by the governor in accordance with standards adopted by the depart-
ment of finance, and in addition thereto he may be allowed actual travel-
ing expenses necessarily incurred in attending to official business. lie shall 
qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office and by giving to the state 
a bond in such amount and in such form as shall be prescribed by the de-
partment of finance, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties. 
The premiums on such bond shall be paid by the state. 
7-1-3. Biennial reports by commissioner.—The bank commissioner shall 
make on or before the 1st day of October, biennially, a report to the gov-
ernor, containing a copy of the last report furnished by each institution 
under the supervision of the banking department and any other proceed-
ings had or done by the department showing generally the condition of 
the businesses under the supervision of the banking department and such 
other matters in connection with such businesses as may be of intorcsl 1o 
the public; and a detailed statement, verified by oath, of all fees and other 
moneys received by the department during the same period. 
7-1-7. Institutions under banking department.—All banks, all loan and 
trust corporations, all building? and loan associations, all industrial loan 
companies, all credit unions, all small loan businesses required to obtain 
a license under any provision of law, and all bank service corporations 
shall be under the supervision of the banking department, and shall be 
subject to examination by the bank commissioner and the examiners. 
7-1-8. Visitation and examination.—The bank commissioner, or an 
ixamincr, shall visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every loan 
ind trust corporation, every building and loan association, every industrial 
oan company, every small loan business, and every co-operative bank, at 
least once in each year. At every such examination careful inquiry shall 
be made as to the condition and resources of the institution examined, 
the mode of conducting and managing its affairs, the official actions of 
its directors and oflficers, the investment and disposition of its funds, the 
security afforded to members, if any, and to those by whom its engage-
ments are held, whether or not it is violating any of the provisions of law 
relating to corporations or to the business of the institution examined, 
whether or not it is complying with its articles of incorporation and 
bylaws, and as to such other matters as the commissioner may prescribe. 
7-1-13. Removal of incompetent bank officers and employees.—If tlie 
bank commissioner finds that any officer or employee of any institution 
under the supervision of the bankinp department is dishonest, reckless or 
incompetent, or fails to perform any duty of his office, he shall notify the 
board of directors of such institution in writing of his objections to 6uch 
officer or employee, and said board shall within twenty days after receipt 
of such notification meet and consider such objections, first piving notice 
to the bank commissioner of the time and place of meeting. If tlie board 
finds the objections well-founded, such officer or employee shall be im-
mediately removed. 
7-1-14. Directors to examine affairs of institution.—The bank commis-
sioner may at any time, and at least once a year shall, require the board 
of directors of every institution under the supervision of the banking 
department to examine or cause to be examined fully the books, papers 
and affairs of the institution of which they are directors, and particularly 
the loans, discounts and overdrafts thereof, with a special purpose of 
ascertaining the value and security thereof and of the'collateral security, if 
any, given in connection therewith, and to inquire into such other matters 
as the bank commissioner or bank examiner may require, and to cause a 
report thereof to be placed on file with the records of such institution, 
which report shall be subject to examination by the bank commissioner or 
examiner. 
7-1-17. Reports — Number per year — Publication — Fees.—The bank 
commissioner shall each year make not less than four calls for report of 
condition upon each bank and trust company under the supervision of 
the banking department. Such report shall be made according to the form 
prescribed by the bank commissioner, and shall be verified by the oath or 
affirmation of the president or cashier and attested by at least three 
directors. A copy thereof duly certified by the bank commissioner shall 
be published by the institution making the same in some newspaper hav-
ing general circulation in the county where the institution is situated, 
and proof of such publication shall be filed in the office of the bank 
commissioner within thirty days from the time of the receipt by the 
institution of the copy certified by the bank commissioner. The fee for 
filing and certifying each 6uch report shall be $5. 
7-1-18. Calls for special reports.—The bank commissioner shall have 
power to call for special reports from any institution under the super-
vision of the banking department whenever in his judgment the same 
may be necessary. 
Procedure on application—jucuciai review
 v* «~*, ~ 
missioner—Revocation for failure to activate business—Resale of charter, 
license or permit prohibited.—(1) The bank commissioner shall have dis-
cretionary power in the approval of articles of incorporation of institu-
tions subject to the supervision of the banking department and applications 
for licenses to transact in this state any business subject to such supervision, 
aud mav refuse to grant his approval when the plan of operation docs not 
complv'with the laws of this state governing sucli institution or business, 
or with accepted and prevailing practices, or when the incorporators or 
organizers or anv of them shall not be of such character, responsibility and 
general fitness as to warrant the belief that the business will be honestly 
conducted in accordance with law and for the best interests of the members, 
customers and depositors of the institution, or when the location or field of 
operation of the proposed business shall be in such close proximity to an 
established business subject to this title that such established business 
might be unreasonablv interfered with and the support of the new business 
would be such as to make improbable its success, or when other good and 
sufficient reasons exist for such refusal. 
(2) Au application for approval of articles of incorporation of a bank, 
loan and trust company or industrial loan corporation shall be set forth 
in such form and contain such information as the bank commissioner may 
reasonably require. Upon receipt of an application and not less than thirty 
days before acting on an application, the bank commissioner 6hall give 
notice thereof by publication in three successive issues in a newspaper of 
general circulation in the county in which the principal pUce of business 
is to be established. Any interested person may file a written protest to the 
granting of such application stating the grounds therefor. The bank com-
missioner may, at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any application 
whether or not a protest is filed. Any application not acted upon within 
six months from the date of filing shall be deemed denied, and the bank 
commissioner shall thereupon issue a written decision denying the appli-
cation. 
(3) The decision of the bank commissioner granting or denying an 
application shall be in writing and state tlie reasons therefor. A copy of 
the decision shall be mailed by the bank commissioner to the applicant and 
all protestants. The bank commissioner may impose such reasonable con-
ditions on the granting of an application as he deems necessary for the 
public welfare and to carry out the purposes of this act. 
(4) Any applicant for an approval of articles of incorporation, a permit 
to establish a branch, or a license to transact any business subject to the 
supervision of the banking department or any protestant to such applica-
tion, feeling aggrieved by the act, decision or ruling of the bank com-
missioner with respect thereto, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof 
by filing, within thirty days after the decision or ruling of the bank com-
missioner is issued, any applicable form of action (including actions for 
declaratory judgment or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction), 
in the district court of the district in which the office of the bank com-
missioner is located. The reviewing court shall have power to hold un-
lawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner 
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not 
in accordance with law. 
(5) Any approval by the bank commissioner of articles of incor-
poration, a license to conduct business or an application to establish a 
branch shall be deemed revoked unless the business so authorized is open 
and operating within one year of the date of such approval, except that 
the bank commissioner, on written application made before the expiration 
of such period and for pood cause shown, may extend the date for activa-
tion for additional periods not to exceed six months each. 
(6) It shall be unlawful to obtain, for the purpose of resale, a charter, 
license or permit to operate any bank or other financial institution under the 
supervision of the banking department. The charter, license or permit may 
be deemed revoked and the bank commissioner may take possession of the 
business and property of any bank of other financial institution under his 
of a license or permit to do business by the bank commissioner, the assets 
or the license to do business or more than 49 per cent of the authorized 
capital stock of such bank or other financial institution is sold or exchanged, 
or if, within such period, such bank or other financial institution merges or 
consolidates with another bank or other financial institution, unless the 
bank or other financial institution involved shall establish upon written 
application to the bank commissioner and by the clear preponderance of 
the evidence, that its charter, license or permit was not obtained for the 
purpose of resale or that such sale, exchange, merger or consolidation is 
necessary to protect depositors or prevent failure. 
7-1 -27, Foreign corporations—Commissioner may revoke certificate.— 
Tlie bank commissioner may for cause at any time revoke tlie certificate 
of approval and authorization of any foreign corporation authorized to 
transact any business in this state and subject to tlie supervision of the 
banking department. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability 
—Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of employee— 
Limitations on personal liability.—Nothing contained in this act, unless 
specifically provided, is to be construed as an admission or denial of lia-
bility or responsibility in so far as governmental entities are concerned. 
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this act, consent to be sued is 
granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were 
a private person. 
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to 
the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negli-
gence, fraud, or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color 
of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act 
due to gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
70B 1-102 Purposes—Bules of conitruction.—(1) This act shall be 
liberally con-trued and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies 
f2N The underlying purposes and policies of this act are: 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernire the law governing retail in-
stallment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury; 
(b) to provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of eredit 
to consumers; 
(c) to further consumer understanding of the terms of credit trans-
actions and to foster competition among suppliers of consumer 
credit so that consumers may obtain credit at reasonable cost; 
(d) to protect consumer buyers, lessees, and borrowers against unfair 
practices by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due regard 
for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors; 
(e) to permit and encourage the development of fair and economically 
sound credit practices; 
(f) to conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to 
the policies of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [Aet 
of May 29. 1968, PL 90-321, 82 Stat 146, 15 U.SC. §§1601 to 
1677; 18 USC §§891 to 896]; and 
(g) to make uniform the law, including administrative rules, among 
the various jurisdictions. 
(3) A reference to a requirement imposed by this act includes reference 
•« » related rule of the administrator adopted pursuant to this act 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their emplovees are concerned If immunity from 
suit is waived b> this chapter, consent to be sued is gTanted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
70BJ-104 Definition—"Consumer loan".—(1) Except with reipect to 
a loan primarily secured by au interest in land (section 70B-3-105), "con-
sumer loan*' is a loan made by a person regularly engaged in the business 
of making loans in which 
(a) the debtor is a person other than an organization; 
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household, 
or agricultural purpose; 
(c) either the debt is payable in installments or a loan finance charge 
is made; and 
(d) either the principal does not exceed $25,000 or the debt is secured 
by an interest in land. 
(2) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pur-
suant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (section 70B-1-106). 
70B 2-104. Definition—"Consumer credit sale."—(1) Except as pro-
vided in subsection (2), "consumer credit sale" is a sale of goods, services, 
or an interest in land in which: 
(a) credit is granted or arranged by a seller who regularly engages 
as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind, 
(b) the buyer is a person other than an organization, 
(c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily 
for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose, 
(d) either the debt is payable in installments or a credit service 
charge is made, and 
(e) with respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed 
does not exceed $25,000. 
(2) Unless the sale is made subject to this act by agreement (section 
70B-2-601), "consumer credit sale" does not include : 
(a) a sale in which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods or 
services pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement, or 
(b) except aa provided with respect to maximum charpes (section 
70B-2-201), disclosure (section 70B-2-301) and debtors' remedies 
(section 70B-5-201), a sale of an interest in land which is used or 
expected to be used as the residence of the buyer. 
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change 
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounta (section 
70B-M06). 
70B-2-106. Definition—"Consumer lease."—(1) "Consumer lease" means 
a lease of goods 
(a) which a lessor regularly engaged in the business 01 leasing makes 
to a person, other than an organization, who takes under the 
lease primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricul-
tural purpose, 
(b) in which the amount payable under the lease does not exceed 
$25,000, and 
(c) which is for a term exceeding four months. 
(2) "Consumer lease" does not include a lease made pursuant to a 
lender credit card or similar arrangement. 
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change 
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (section 
70B-M06). 
70B6104. Powers of administrator—Harmony with federal rtful*-
tions—Reliance on ralei—Duty to report.—(1) In addition to other powen 
irr.uitd by this act, the administrator within the limitations provided 
by law may: 
fa) receive and act on complaints, takf action designed to obtain 
voluntary compliance with this act, or commence proceedings 
on his own initiative; 
(b) counsel persons and groups on their rights and duties under 
this act; 
(c) establish programs for the education of consumers with respect 
to credit practices and problems; 
(il» make studies appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies 
of this act and make the results available to the public; 
(e) adopt, amend, and repeal substantive rules when specifically au-
thorized by this act, and adopt, amend, and repeal procedural 
rules to carry out the provisions of this act; 
(f i maintain offices within this state; and 
(p) employ any necessary hearing examiners, clerks, and other em-
ployees and agents. 
'2) The administrator shall, adopt rules not inconsistent with the 
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act to assure a meaningful disclosure 
of credit terms so that a prospective debtor will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him and to avoid the 
uninformed use of credit. These rules may supersede any provisions of this 
act which are inconsistent with the Federal Credit Protection Art if the 
administrator finds 6uch an inconsistency to exist and declares, that the 
purpose of superseding this act is to resolve this inconsistency and may 
require disclosure by person* who arrange for the extension of credit, may 
contain classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide 
for adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions subject to 
this act which in the judgment of the administrator are necessary or proper 
to effectuate the purposes* or to prt?\«nt cm um\ehti<»n or evasion of. or t<» 
facilitate compliance with, the provisions of this act relating to disclosure 
of credit terms. 
(3) To keep the administrator's rules in harmony with the Federal 
Consumer Credit Protection Act and the regulations prescribed fr«>m 
time to time pursuant to that act by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and with the rules of administrators in other 
jurisdictions which enact t*he Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the admin-
istrator, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies and provisions 
of this act, shall: 
(a) before adopting, amending, and repealing rules, advise and consult 
with administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code; and 
(b) in adopting, amending, and repealing rules, take into considera-
tion : 
(i) the regulations 60 prescribed by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System; and 
(ii) the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
(4) Except for refund of an excess charge, no liability is imposed 
under this act for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule of the 
administrator notwithstanding, that after the act or omission the rule 
may be amended or repealed or be determined by judicial or other au-
thority to be invalid for any reason. 
70B-3-506. Examinations and investigations—(1) The administrator 
shall examine periodically at intervals be deems appropriate tbe loans, 
business, and records of every licensee. In addition, for tbe purpose 
of discovering violations of this act or securing information lawfully re-
quired, the administrator or the official or agency to whose supervision 
the organization is subject (section 70B-6-105) may at any time investigate 
the loans, business, and records of any regulated lender. For these purposes 
he shall have free and reasonable access to tbe offices, places of business, 
and records of the lender. 
(2) If the lender's records are located outside this state, the lender 
at his option shall make them available to the administrator at a convenient 
location within this state, or pay the reasonable and necessary expenses 
for the administrator or his representative to examine them at the place 
vrhrre they are maintained. The administrator may designate representa-
tives, im-ludmg comparable officials of the state in which the records are 
located, to inspect them on his behalf. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the administrator may admin-
ister oaths or affirmations, and upon his own motion or upon request 
of any party may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce 
evidence, and require the production of any matter which is relevant to the 
investigation, including the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge or relevant 
facts, or any other matter reasonably calculated to lead to tbe discovery 
of admissible evidence. 
(4) Upon failure without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena or to give 
testimony and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, the 
administrator may apply to the district court where his offices are located 
for an order compelling compliance. 
70B-S-603 License to make supervised loans.—(1) The administrator 
shall receive and act on all applications for licenses to make supervised 
loans under this act. Applications shall be filed in the manner prescribed 
by the administrator and shall contain the information the administrator 
requires by rule to mako nn evaluation of the financial responsibility, char-
acter and fitness of the applicant 
70B-S-504. Revocation or suspension of license.—(1) The administra-
tor may issue to a person licensed to make supervised loans an order to 
ahow cause why his license should not be revoked or suspended for a period 
not in excess of six months. The order shall state the place for a hearing 
and set a time for the hearing that is no less than ten days from the date 
of the order. After the hearing the administrator shall revoke or suspend 
the license if be finds that: 
(a) the licensee has repeatedly and willfully violated thia act or any 
rule or order lawfully made pursuant to this act; or 
(b) facts or conditions exist which would clearly have justified the 
administrator in refusing to grant a license had these facts or 
conditions been known to exist at tht time the application for 
the license was made. 
(2) No revocation or suspension of a license is lawful unless prior to 
institution of proceedings by the administrator notice is given to the 
licensee of the facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and 
the licensee is given an opportunity to ahow compliance with all lawful 
requirements for retention of the license. 
(3) If the administrator finds that probable cause for revocation of a 
license exists and that enforcement of this act requires immediate suspen-
sion of the license pending investigation, he may, after a hearing upon five 
days' written notice, enter an order suspending the license for not more 
than thirty days. 
(4) Whenever the administrator revokes or suspends a license, he 
ahall enter an order to that effect and forthwith notify the licensee of the 
revocation or suspension. "Within five days after the entry of the order 
he shall deliver to the licensee a copy of the order and the findings sup-
porting the order. 
(5) Any person holding a license to make supervised loans may re-
linquish the license by notifying the administrator in writing of its relin-
quishment, but this relinquishment ahall not affect his liability for acta 
previously committed. 
(6) No revocation, suspension, or relinquishment of a license ahall 
impair or affect the obligation of any pre-existing lawful contract between 
the licensee and any debtor. 
(7) The administrator may reinstate a license, terminate a suspension, 
or grant a new license to a person who** license has been revoked or 
suspended if no fact or condition then exists which clearly would have 
justified the administrator in refusing to grant a license. 
(5) The administrator shall report to the governor and legislature on 
the operation of his office, on the use of credit in the state, and on the 
problem! of persons of small means obtaining credit from persons regularly 
engaged in extending aales or loan credit. For the purpose of making the 
report, the administrator is authorired to conduct ro>cnrch and make ap-
propriate studies The report shall include a description of the examination 
and investigation procedures and policies of his otter, a statement of policies 
followed in deciding whether to investigate or examine the offices of credit 
•nppliers subject to this act, a statement of the number and percentages of 
offices which are periodically investigated or examined, a statement of the 
types of consumer credit problem* of both creditors and debtors which 
have come to his attention through his examinations and investigations and 
the disposition of them under existing law, a statement of the extent to 
which the rules of the administrator pursuant to this act are not in harmony 
with the regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System pursuant to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 
or tl.e rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which ena^t the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code and the reasons for such variations, and a 
general statement of the activities of his office arid of others to promote the 
purposes of this act. The report shall not identify the creditors against 
whom action is Uken by the administrator. 
70B-6109. Assurance of discontinuance—If it is claimed that a person 
has engag.-d in conduct subject to an order by the administrator (section 
70B-G-10*; or by a court (sections 70P.-C1W through 7UlM>-nL\, the 
administrator ma'y accept an .assurance in writing that the person will n-t 
engage in the conduct in tire future. If a person giving an assurance of 
discontinuance fails to comply with its terms, the assurance is evidence 
that prior to the assurance he engaged in the conduct described in the 
assurance. 
for other appropriate relief. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
7&-12-26. Within three years.—Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; 
provided, that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detainbg or injuring personal property, 
including actions for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in all casea 
where the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in 
the term "livestock," having upon it at the time of its loss a recorded 
mark or brand, if such animal had strayed or was stolen from the true 
owner without his fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued 
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a 
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but the 
cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud 
or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this 
7&-12-28. Within two yean .—Within two years: 
(1) An action against a marshal, sheriff, constable or other officer npon 
a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in 
Tirtne of his office, or by the omission of an official doty, inclnding the 
nonpayment of money collected npon an execution; bnt this section shall 
notapply to an action for an escape. 
(2) An action to recover damages for the death of one caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another. 
78-12-29. Within one year. 
Within one year: 
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state. 
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action 
is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when 
the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation. 
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal 
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state. 
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or 
seduction. 
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a pris-
oner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process. 
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to 
property caused by a mob or riot. 
